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Abstract
The high performance of Dutch and Flemish 15-year-old native pupils:  
Explaining country differences in math scores between highly stratified educational 
systems**
This paper aims to explain the high scores of 15-year-old native pupils in the Netherlands 
and Flanders by comparing them with the scores of pupils in countries with the same 
highly stratified educational system. Therefore, we compare only the educational 
performance of 15-year-old pupils from the following regions: the Netherlands, Flanders, 
Wallonia, the German Länder, the Swiss German cantons, and Austria. We use the data 
from the general Program for International Pupil Assessment (PISA) 2006 together with 
the specific PISA data of Germany and Switzerland also from 2006. We apply a multilevel 
model that takes into account the individual-, curriculum-, and system-level features 
in these highly stratified educational systems. The high scores of the Dutch pupils can 
be explained by the size of the Netherlands’ vocational sector. The high Flemish scores 
can be only partly explained by the high curriculum mobility (as indicated by the lowest 
level of entrance selection). Central exit exams are not a good explanation of the high 
Dutch scores. Despite being limited to highly stratified systems, we still find educational 
policies and arrangements to have significant effects on the educational performance 
of pupils.
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1. Introduction 
 
Since 2000, 15-year-old pupils living in a large number of Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) member states have been participating in the Program for International 
Pupil Assessment (PISA) every three years. The purpose of this assessment is to map competence in 
mathematics, physics, and reading at the end of the period of compulsory education (at the age of 
15 or 16 years in most Western countries). Much attention was given to the high scores of the 
Finnish pupils in the three PISA waves, but the native pupils in the Netherlands and Flanders also 
scored quite high in reading and math relative to pupils in other European countries. 
The Dutch and Flemish performance particularly stands out when compared to that of 
European countries with very similar educational systems and socioeconomic opportunities, such as 
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. All these countries have highly stratified educational systems 
with a vocational education tradition (besides general education), which already influences the early 
stages of secondary education. In addition, the socioeconomic features of these countries are very 
similar; therefore the differences in the scores cannot be attributed to either system levels or 
compositional features. Consequently, our question is why do these pupils score differently in spite 
of these sociostructural and societal similarities? 
This study aims to answer this and explain the high scores of 15-year-old pupils native1 to 
the Netherlands and Flanders by comparing them with those of the pupils of countries with a highly 
stratified educational system, that is, Germany, Switzerland, and Austria.2 This restriction to highly 
stratified systems and native pupils is deliberate, for we are interested in the variation of outcomes 
and its determinants within the same type of system. Unlike previous studies that generally argue 
that different educational systems produce different outcomes (Shavit & Muller, 1998; Kerckhoff, 
2001; Hanushek & Wössmann, 2005; Horn, 2009; Dunne, 2010), ours examines the differences 
within highly stratified educational systems in terms of both outcomes and determinants. 
A particular feature of the Belgian, German, and Swiss educational systems is that their 
educational policies are fully decentralized. Each of the Belgian regions, German Länder, and Swiss 
cantons enjoys full political independence in their educational affairs. This autonomy is an ideal 
setup for studying the educational outcomes of pupils from the Netherlands and Flanders since it 
																																																								
1.	 We limit ourselves in this study to native pupils because educational systems have different outcomes for pupils with a 
migrant background than for native pupils (Dronkers, van der Velden & Dunne, 2012) and because the Dutch PISA 2006 
wave does not have information about the countries of birth of pupils and parents. 
2. We did not include Liechtenstein or Luxemburg in our analysis, although these countries also have a highly stratified 
system, with general and vocational schools. Due to their small size and particular positions, inclusion would have 
posed problems.		
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increases the number of highly stratified educational systems to which these two countries can be 
compared. 
However, this approach has the hidden risk of producing results that are highly politically 
sensitive. Particularly in Germany, the comparison of the outcomes of the German Länder and their 
determinants is a delicate issue. One of the main raisons for such sensitivity is that Germany scores 
relatively low in cross-country comparisons, while the variation in average outcomes is very high 
across the German Länder. Consequently, the German Länder strictly forbids any internal German 
comparisons with the PISA and the consequences for disobeying this restriction are quite severe.3 
To avoid such problems, we are forced to limit our analysis and not explore existing differences 
between identifiable German Länder.4 Nevertheless, this is the first time this particular comparative 
setup has been used to explain the high scores of the Netherlands and Flanders. 
Our approach to the question can be outlined as follows. We present the theoretical 
framework from which our hypotheses are derived. Next we outline the multilevel model with 
which we analyze the data. This model contains three levels (pupils, curricula, and systems) instead 
of the usual two levels approach (pupils and systems). Therefore we give this three-level model 
more attention. We then present the data and our analysis. The final section discusses the wider 
interpretation and consequences of our results, not only for the Netherlands and Flanders but also 
for countries with highly stratified educational systems (including Germany). 
 
2. Differences in performance between educational systems: The trade-off between equity 
and efficiency 
 
Only since recently have scholars agreed that the educational outcomes of pupils in different 
educational systems vary systematically. Pupils in comprehensive educational systems have, on 
average, higher scores than equivalent pupils in highly stratified educational systems, where the 
selection of students into different secondary education curricula takes place at a very early age 
																																																								
3. The following is an excerpt of the contract we had to sign with the German educational authorities—represented by the Institut 
zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (IQB)—to be granted access to so-called PISA+ data: 
 Data access is granted on condition that no German federal states are named or made identifiable – intentionally or 
unintentionally – in any publication of the research results. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the data recipient to ensure that 
no German federal state can be identified through the combination of any parameters or features published with the research 
results…. For every case of non-compliance with his obligations set out in sentence 1, the data recipient shall pay the FDZ 
[Forschungsdatenzentrum] a contractual penalty of up to 10.000 € (ten thousand Euros). The right of the FDZ to claim further 
damages in the event of a higher amount of loss caused by the data recipient's offence remains unaffected. 
4. This restriction on any internal German comparison of the educational performance of the Länder also applies to the 
NEPS data (National Educational Panel Study), the only educational data available at the German federal level (see 
http://www.neps-data.de/en-us/home.aspx). 
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(Shavit & Muller, 1998; Kerckhoff, 2001; Hanushek & Wössmann, 2005; Horn, 2009; Dunne, 
2010). 
The literature puts forward several arguments to explain this disparity. The degree of 
stratification of the educational system, measured by the degree of tracking, is directly related to a 
perceived trade-off between the equity and efficiency of educational achievement. Typically, highly 
stratified systems perform better in terms of efficiency and worse in terms of equity compared to 
comprehensive systems; however, the gain in efficiency is smaller than the loss in equity. In highly 
stratified education systems, where homogeneous classrooms permit a focused curriculum and 
appropriately paced instruction, maximizing learning within a track, the pupils in the lowest tracks 
will be systematically disadvantaged by slower learning environments that leave them behind those 
in the upper tracks in terms of skills. 
Another explanation for the lower performance of pupils in highly stratified systems is the 
presence of so-called nonlinear peer effects. The diverse learning environment may benefit lower-
ability students (in terms of higher motivation, exposure to better class discussion, etc.) without 
disadvantaging higher-ability students (Wössmann, 2003). 
In sum, highly stratified systems have a high degree of efficiency from promoting more 
tailor-made learning; however, they produce lower overall equity by disadvantaging the students in 
the lowest tracks. The opposite is true for comprehensive systems. 
In the production of lower or higher efficiency and equity schools play an important role as 
the mediating features between the systems and pupils. School characteristics, being a measure of 
educational environment, transmit educational system features into constraints and opportunities for 
pupils to learn and for teachers to teach. School features are the consequences of both the level of 
stratification of educational systems and the choices made in the design of any educational system, 
independently of its stratification level. For instance, differences in school socioeconomic 
composition exist in comprehensive educational systems (as a consequence of spatial segregation 
and school catchment areas) and these differences can be larger in highly stratified systems because 
of the selection of pupils with different scholastic abilities (related to their social background) into 
schools with different levels of curricula. However, if a more challenging curriculum level is taught 
in some schools within a highly stratified system, this can lead to the higher educational 
performance of the pupils in these schools. However, less able pupils will be selected into schools 
with less challenging curricula and their performance may be lower as well. Analogously, if only 
the average level of curriculum is taught in all schools within a comprehensive system, the more 
able pupils will be less challenged and thus may have a lower educational performance, while the 
less able students will be more challenged and thus have a higher performance. System and school 
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features can thus form configurations that may be more or less of an advantage in the educational 
performance of pupils of different socioeconomic backgrounds attending schools with different 
compositions and offering different levels of curricula. 
Dunne (2010) showed empirically that school characteristics have substantially different 
effects on and implications for educational achievement in different educational systems. These 
authors found that school composition matters: Pupils in schools of low socioeconomic composition 
in comprehensive systems have higher educational performance than those in comparable schools 
of low socioeconomic composition in highly stratified education systems, possibly because pupils 
within comprehensive systems are taught a more challenging, average curriculum, while a less 
challenging, below-average curriculum is taught in schools within highly stratified systems. These 
differential effects of school composition in different educational systems may be explained by the 
selection of less or more able pupils into different school types (and thus different school 
compositions) in highly stratified systems, while such a selection of less or more able pupils into 
different schools does not exist in a comprehensive system (although these schools may still have a 
different composition due to spatial segregation). 
In a follow-up study, Dronkers, van der Velden, and Dunne (2011) added curriculum level 
to their analysis of the effect of educational systems. The authors concluded that the inclusion of the 
curriculum level is necessary to avoid overestimation of the school composition effect. Especially in 
stratified educational systems such as those of the Netherlands and Germany, different tracks may 
be nested within the same school, such that the direct learning environment of pupils is better 
approximated by curriculum characteristics than school characteristics. But the addition of 
curriculum level did not alter the earlier conclusion that school characteristics have substantially 
different effects and implications in different educational systems regarding educational 
achievement. 
Given that this study focuses only on a group of highly stratified educational systems, we 
start with the naïve assumption that individual socioeconomic outcomes or school features do not 
have significantly different educational returns across these countries because they all have the 
same educational system. If this is the case, then the next logical question is what other factors can 
explain these differences? This article’s main argument is that there are important differences 
between highly stratified educational systems that can be used to explain the success of the Dutch 
and Flemish educational systems and thus the differences in achievement between the German 
Länder and the Swiss cantons. The next section outlines the main argument and put forward the 
hypothesis to be tested. 
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3. Systematic differences within highly stratified systems 
 
There are three important features in which highly stratified educational systems can differ: 1) the 
standardization of the system by the existence of a central final exam, 2) the system’s vocational 
orientation, and 3) the selection of pupils into different tracks at the start of secondary schooling 
and the level of their mobility between these tracks during secondary education. Interestingly, the 
current literature has devoted some attention to the relevance of these features, but they are often 
confused with the degree of stratification of the educational system (Shavit & Muller, 1998; 
Kerckhoff, 2001; Hanushek & Wössmann, 2005; Horn, 2009; Dunne, 2010). This omission risks 
overlooking the independent role these features have on the effects of the stratification of the 
educational system on individual achievement. 
 These three aspects varies between highly stratified systems and may consequently alter the 
trade-off differentiated educational systems face between equity and efficiency. Moreover, there is a 
reason to believe that these features can either 1) improve equity without reducing efficiency or 2) 
improve efficiency without decreasing equity in highly stratified educational systems. Essentially, 
the trade-off between equity and efficiency centers around the questions of which and how many 
pupils gain or lose in a particular educational system. The average outcome within each system 
reflects the net overall gain or loss in the educational performance of average pupils. Given that the 
average lower performance of the highly stratified system is a combination of the lower 
performance of the larger numbers of students in the lower tracks and the higher performance of the 
smaller numbers of students in the higher tracks, the way grouping of students in tracks occur 
within highly stratified systems becomes of critical importance in the trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. 
  This finding implies that the overall performance of students can be improved in two ways: 
1) by decreasing selectivity and allowing more students to enter the highest track, which would 
increase the performance of middle track students because of the nonlinear peer effect, and 2) by 
increasing the educational focus of the lower tracks and attracting more able students to them. 
Vocational orientation increases the labor market focus of an educational system, particularly for 
students of the lowest tracks. Successful vocationalization of the lower tracks promotes efficient 
learning and employability and these tracks offer an attractive alternative to general education. 
Therefore, in terms of employability, we expect the quality and attractiveness of a vocational 
orientation to be directly related to the performance of pupils within the lowest tracks. 
 While the change in the relative sizes of the tracks increases with equity, it is standardization 
of the educational system that brings about gains in overall performance through higher efficiency 
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in all tracks. The existence of a final central exam is believed to reduce variability between schools 
of the same type and level. By introducing an external standard, student performance is comparable 
across classes and schools and levels of educational quality are rendered observable and transparent. 
This improves the external monitoring of teachers, schools, and pupil performance. By setting such 
standards, a central examination promotes more equal opportunities and efficient learning through 
three different channels: increasing external rewards for learning, decreasing peer pressure against 
learning, and increasing the monitoring of teachers and schools (Wössmann, 2003). 
 Our assumption is that the success of the Dutch and Flemish educational systems is best 
explained by successful implementation of the above-mentioned features. Table 2 shows that 
Netherlands and Flanders indeed stand out when compared to other countries regarding the degree 
of standardization, vocationalization, or mobility of their educational systems. Although the 
Netherlands score high on standardization and vocationalization, Flanders has the lowest level of 
entrance selection. The Netherlands has the highest score for the indicator central exit exam 
(average 0.3 in Table 1) and exceptionally prominent vocational education. Compared to other 
educational systems, that of the Netherlands has an exceptionally large vocational sector (53.3% 
compared to an average of 22.0%; see Table 1). 
 The Flemish educational system has a relatively open admission to each curriculum level of 
secondary school, but a high level of internal (downward) curriculum mobility (the “cascade 
model”) as well (Boone & Van Houtte, 2013). Table 2 shows that Flanders has a relatively low 
score on high selection entrance (0.15 compared to an average of 0.30; see Table 1) and a relatively 
high score on low entrance selection (0.31 compared to an average of 0.21; see Table 1). This may 
be a reflection of their unique cascade model, with a low level of entrance selection but a high level 
of internal downward mobility. Consequently, we formulate our two main hypotheses as follows. 
 1. The high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by a successful combination of 
vocationalization and standardization. We expect the Dutch educational system to be more 
successful at enhancing competition between schools and promoting efficient learning than other 
highly stratified educational systems because of the high level of parental school choice in the 
Netherlands (Netherlands has, together with Flanders, the highest percentage of pupils in private 
dependent schools, 69%, compared to an average of 42%). In the case of the Netherlands, 
competition is achieved by a combination of setting external standards for the quality of schooling 
(a final central test at the end of primary school and a final central examination for all types of 
secondary education) and maintaining an attractive and substantial vocational education. If this is 
true, then the Dutch educational system is more successful at reducing the lower performance of the 
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less successful students (through vocationalization) than other highly stratified educational systems 
while increasing the efficiency of the system as a whole (through standardization). 
 2. Low selectivity (as indicated by low entrance selection) can explain the high scores of the 
Flemish pupils. We expect the Flemish educational system to promote equality among its students 
without reducing its efficiency by placing a higher proportion of them in a higher track at the start 
of their secondary education at age 12. A unique feature of the Flemish system is that due to low 
selectivity, a majority of the students are allowed to enter the highest educational track. However, 
unlike for comprehensive systems, the existence of the lowest tracks ensures the possibility of 
downward mobility during secondary education. We argue that next to equity benefits related to the 
bigger size of the highest tracks, the motivation of students to stay in the highest track is higher than 
the motivation to exit from the lowest track; therefore the educational performance of all pupils can 
be increased. 
 
4. Data, variables, and methodology 
 
Since 2000, the OECD has conducted large-scale tri-annual tests among 15-year-olds living in its 
member states and partner states to assess pupils’ mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy, 
resulting in the PISA data. The purpose of this test is to map competence in mathematics, physics, 
and reading at the end of the period of compulsory education (the age of 15 or 16 in most Western 
countries). We make use of the 2006 wave for the Netherlands, Belgium, German Länder, and the 
Swiss German cantons. The PISA 2006 data of the Swiss German cantons were purchased from the 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office (EDK).5 The PISA 2006 data of the German Länder were obtained 
from the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (IQB) of the Humboldt University 
(Berlin). These additional and extended 2006 German PISA data were collected by the Max-Planck-
Institut für Bildingsforschung/IPN Kiel/the KMK. The PISA data for Austria, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands were obtained from the PISA webpage. Belgium pupils are divided into Flemish and 
Walloon pupils based on the teaching language of their school.6  
The PISA data for each participating country constitute a representative sample of the 
schools that teach 15-year-old pupils. We select only native-born pupils from these datasets, using 
the PISA definition of immigrant pupil.7 Each school that has been selected tests a sample of all 15-
year-olds, irrespective of their curriculum or grade. In addition to educational performance, PISA 
																																																								
5. Swiss dataset of the IX-grade students, PISA 2006, – Federal Statistical Office (EDK). 
6. Schools in Brussels are thus divided into Flemish and Walloon schools. 
7. The student and/or both parents were born outside the test country.	
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also supplies information on a large number of individual background and school characteristics. 
The school principals provide details on a variety of school characteristics such as pupil–teacher 
ratio, teacher shortages, and school location. The pupils’ questionnaires request information on such 
things as the educational level of their parents. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of all the 
variables. 
 
[About here table 1] 
 
4.1. Combination of schools and curricula as an indicator of school level 
 
The PISA data contain two cross-national indicators of the pupil curriculum. The pupil is asked 
whether he or she is currently enrolled in a certain curriculum of a certain level. This is later 
recoded in an internationally comparable format, distinguishing between general and vocational 
curricula, on the one hand, and between lower and higher curricula, on the other. 
Schools are the sampling units in the PISA survey but can contain both general and vocational 
education. In addition, different definitions of a school are applied in different countries. Whereas 
in some, such as the Netherlands a school is defined as an “administrational unit”, in others, such as 
Germany, it is defined as a “location”. Therefore, we assume that the curriculum-level 
characteristics within these schools reflect more precisely the level of the daily teaching and 
learning environment than the administrative unit of a school. We call this combination of schools 
and curricula the curriculum level. We compute the indicator of the curriculum level for each pupil 
by combining his or her school identification number, the kind of curriculum he or she is following 
(vocational or general), and the curriculum level (low, medium, or high). 
While focusing on highly stratified educational systems, this study also includes both school 
and curriculum features. Indeed, school and curriculum characteristics are not independent of the 
educational systems in which they operate but, rather, heavily conditioned by them. Therefore our 
analysis has three-levels: educational systems (either the unitary state or the cantons, Länder, or 
language community), curricula as a measure of learning environments and educational goals, and 
pupils with different social and cultural backgrounds and learning histories.8 
 
 
																																																								
8. We also added a fourth highest level for the five national states without any explanatory variable (see Section 5). 
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4.2. Dependent variable: Math performance 
 
The dependent variable in this study is math performance. To measure math skills accurately would 
make the test too long to be feasible. Hence a large number of very similar but shorter tests were 
created. Since such different tests can never have exactly the same degree of difficulty, item 
response modeling was used to achieve comparable results between pupils who took different tests. 
Our analysis averages the five plausible values obtained from the item response modeling. The 
math skills scores are standardized for the OECD countries, using an average of 500 and a standard 
deviation of 100. Table 2 shows the average scores and standard deviations of the reading and math 
scores by country, Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German 
Länder.9 
 
[About here table 2] 
 
4.3. Individual-level variables of all pupils 
 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. 
4.3.1. Parental ESCS. The index of the economic, social, and cultural status (ESCS) of the 
parents is a composite index created in the PISA dataset of the occupational status of the parents 
measured with the International Socio-economic Index for Occupational Status (ISEI) scale 
(Ganzeboom, De Graaf, Treiman & De Leeuw, 1992), the educational level of the parents measured 
with the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED;  UNESCO, 2006), and the 
presence of any material or cultural resources at the pupils’ homes.10 This combination of the 
parents’ occupational status and educational level together with the resources at home produces the 
strongest indicator of the parental environment. We set the average of the parental ESCS for each 
destination country to zero to ensure that the comparisons for this item show the result for the 
average pupil in these countries. 
																																																								
9.	 Comparable detailed information about the averages of the Länder has already been published by Köller, Knigge, and Tesch 
(2010). However, according to the contract (see footnote 3), we are not allowed to publish comparable detailed information. 
Therefore we grouped the Länder into five categories, but only for this table, not in the analysis.	
10. The measure consists of the presence of a desk, a private room, a quiet place to study, a computer, educational software, Internet 
access, literature or poetry, art, books that may be of use in schoolwork, a dictionary, a dishwasher, and the presence of more 
than 100 books in the house. 
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4.3.2. Grade. We have included a variable to account for the fact that not all pupils attend the 
same grade. As a result of between-country variance in the way grades are constructed, we have 
standardized the grade around a country’s modal grade. 
4.3.3. Female. We control for gender effects by using a dummy variable indicating whether a 
pupil is female (one) or male (zero). 
 
4.4. Variables measured at the curriculum level 
 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. 
4.4.1. Levels of curriculum. We distinguish between three curriculum levels: 1) Lower 
vocational curriculum, a dummy indicating whether a pupil is currently enrolled in lower vocational 
type of education (ISCED classification); 2) Medium, a dummy indicating whether a pupil is 
currently enrolled in a higher vocational or lower general type of education, and 3) High, a dummy 
indicating whether a pupil is enrolled in the highest level of general education, giving entrance 
rights to university education. In addition, we use these dummies as our indicators of curriculum 
levels to compute school composition features. More information on these curriculum levels are in 
Appendix I.11 
4.4.2. Socioeconomic school diversity. Similarly, we calculate the sociocultural diversity at the 
curriculum level. Using the ESCS scores of the parents, we divide these parental scores into five 
categories: the group with the lowest 10% of scores, the 10–30% group, the 30–70% group, the 70–
90% group, and the group with the highest 10% of scores.12 On the basis of these five categories, 
we calculate the Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity (varying between zero and one).13 The 
index should be interpreted as follows: A value of zero means there is no diversity because all 
parents of all pupils at that particular curriculum level are in the same ESCS category. A value 
approaching one indicates a very high level of diversity, where pupils are equally recruited from the 
five ESCS categories. Since this Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity is “level blind” and 
therefore insensitive to the average parental educational level, we added the average ESCS of the 
curriculum level to the analysis. 
																																																								
11. Note that the construction of these three dummies deviates from the approach of Dronkers, van der Velden & Dunne (2011), who 
divide the Medium category into a vocational and a general type. 
12. The groups are defined as follows: 1) less than 10%, ESCS < -1.1; 20 10–30%, -1.0 < ESCS < -0.4; 3) 30–70%, -0.3 < ESCS < 
0.6; 4) 70–90%, 0.7 < ESCS < 1.2; 5) more than 90%, ESCS > 1.3. 
13. The Herfindahl index of sociocultural diversity is calculated as follows: 1 - ((percentage of parents from ESCS group 1) 2 + 
(percentage of parents from ESCS group 2) 2 + … + (percentage of parents from ESCS group 5) 2).  
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4.4.3. Percentage of native pupils. The Dutch PISA data 2006 do not contain the country of 
birth of the pupils and parents because the Dutch Minister of Education did not want to know that 
important variable (Dronkers, 2005). Therefore we cannot distinguish between immigrants from 
different origin countries. In this case the omission is less serious than in an OECD-wide 
comparison, because the countries of origin of the immigrants in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and 
the Netherlands are more or less comparable (see Appendix C of Dronkers, van der Velden & 
Dunne, 2011). However, the percentage of native pupils in each of these educational systems does 
vary and needs to be included in our analysis. 
4.4.4. Average ESCS. We calculate the average parental ESCS per curriculum level as the best 
indicator of school socioeconomic composition. 
 
4.5. Variables measured at the school level 
 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. We use these 
school-level indicators as curriculum-level indicators. 
4.5.1. Selective admittance. Selective admittance of pupils to a school is a scale in the PISA 
data based on the answers of the principals indicating whether admittance to their schools is based 
on academic record and/or recommendations. We divide the scale into three dummies: high 
selection, medium selection (reference category), and low selection. 
4.5.2. Urbanization. Two dummies were constructed to indicate whether a school is located in 
(large) city or a rural area. Schools in an urbanized countryside or a (small) town serve as the 
reference category. 
4.5.3. School size. School size is the number of pupils in the school, based on the answers of 
the principals. 
4.5.4. Private/public. Educational systems differ in the shares of public and private schools and 
the degree of state grants for these private schools. Two dummies are constructed to separate private 
state dependent and private state independent schools from public schools. These variables control 
for these system differences and the effectiveness of these school types (Dronkers & Robert, 2008; 
Dronkers & Avram, 2010a, 2010b). 
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4.6. Variables measured at the educational system level 
 
All the averages and standard deviations of these variables are given in Table 2 by country, 
Belgium language community, Swiss canton, and combination of German Länder. 
4.6.1. Central exit examination. This standardization variable refers to the degree to which 
clear external standards or incentives exist in an educational system to maintain the quality level of 
the education it provides. This variable indicates the extent to which educational systems have a set 
of standard rules and guidelines education should follow (Wössmann, 2003). An example of a clear 
external standard is conducting nationally standardized exams at the end of secondary education. 
Therefore, we have constructed the dummy variable central exit examination, which takes value 
one if there is a standardized central exit exam at the end of high school in the educational system. 
This dummy takes the value zero if there is none. 
4.6.2. Percentage of pupils enrolled in a lower vocational curriculum. Studies  (Shavit & 
Blossfeld, 1995) have shown that an educational system’s vocational orientation increases its labor 
market focus. This can reduce (vocational education as a dead-end street) or enhance (vocational 
education as a safety net) equality and promote efficient learning. We control for this 
vocationalization of each educational system by looking at the percentage of the total number of 
pupils enrolled in the lower vocational curriculum. We derive this percentage by aggregating the 
percentage of pupils in lower vocational education by country, region, Land, or canton. 
4.6.3. Socioeconomic gradient. This variable depicts the relation between the educational 
achievement and socioeconomic background of the pupils in each separate educational system. The 
gradient by country, region, Land, or canton is derived from the coefficient of the ESCS after 
controlling for the individual characteristics of gender and grade (Appendix II, model 2, but 
separately by country, region, Land, or canton). A high score of this socioeconomic gradient means 
that the effect of parental background on educational performance is strong in that country, region, 
Land, or canton.14 
4.6.4. First age of selection of pupils. This age varies only between 10 and 12 years within 
highly stratified systems. 
 
 
 
																																																								
14. Controlling for grade can lead to an underestimation of the socioeconomic gradient of a country, region, Land, or canton if 
repeating or skipping classes in a country is more dependent on socioeconomic background than in the other countries. Given the 
similarities of the highly stratified systems analyzed, substantial cross-country variation in the relation between repeating or 
skipping classes and socioeconomic background is unlikely. 
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4.7. The Model 
 
We use multilevel modeling for the purpose of our empirical analysis because our data are 
hierarchically clustered in groups. Therefore the data violate the conditional independence 
assumption about error terms from the classical linear regression model. This multilevel analysis 
has four hierarchical levels: the national state, educational systems, curriculum levels, and the 
pupils. In a number of cases the multilevel solution did not converge. We indicate such a non-
convergence in Tables 4 and 5. In these cases we applied a three-level model (educational systems, 
curriculum levels, and pupils).15 
We divide the observations into five different groups at the national state level according to the 
national state to which a student belongs: Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, or 
Switzerland. We have added this national state level to capture the possible effect of a specific 
national state on educational performance, besides the features of the different educational systems 
within these states. Note that in all models this national state level contains significant unexplained 
variance. Only for Austria and the Netherlands is there no variation at the educational system level, 
because both countries are unitary states with regard to education. The dummy for the Netherlands 
is thus situated at the national state level, with only five cases. The dummy for Flanders is situated 
at the educational system level, with 26 cases. School characteristics are transferred to the 
curriculum level to make the multilevel analysis manageable. The advantage of multilevel modeling 
for the purpose of our analysis is that it allows for a direct estimation of the importance of these 
different levels in the causal process. 
 
5. Analyses 
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for all relevant individual, school, and system variables for 
the different educational systems of the countries, regions, cantons and groups of Länder, 
separately. Table 3 shows the differences in the average level of ESCS for each level of 
curriculum.16 As we can see from these tables, although these educational systems are all highly 
stratified, with a strong tradition in vocational training, there are considerable differences between 
																																																								
15. The non-convergence of some four-level models may be due to the limitation of the general program STATA, which we we had 
to use to analyze the German data in the IQB building. The MlWin program, specialized in multilevel analysis, converges with 
no problem in situations where STATA does not converge but we were not allowed to use our laptops with MlWin for this 
analysis in the IQB building. 
16. Because of the restrictions in the contract with IQB, we are not allowed to identify the Länder in Table 3. Therefore we averaged 
the values for all the German Länder into five groups. This grouping of Länder is not used in the multilevel analyses, where we 
use the Länder separately.  
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them regarding the average ESCS at the individual and curriculum levels. Moreover, the systems 
differ in the socioeconomic segregation of pupils at different levels. 
 
[Table 3, about here] 
 
We conducted a series of multilevel analyses for math scores. The full results are given in the 
Appendices II to V. Model 1 includes only dummies for the Netherlands and Flanders and thus 
gives the degree to which the scores of Dutch and Flemish pupils are higher than the average scores 
of pupils from Austria, the German Länder, the Swiss German cantons, and Wallonia.17 Model 2 
includes the Dutch and Flemish dummies and the individual characteristics. 
 
[About here table 4] 
 
Models 3 to 6 include the curriculum-level features separately, while model 7 contains controls for 
both individual and all curriculum features together. We summarize the coefficients for Flanders 
and the Netherlands from the multilevel equations in Table 4 and Appendix II gives all the 
coefficients of these seven models. Table 5 shows all the coefficients of model 7. 
The next step in our series of multilevel analyses includes features of the educational systems. 
At this level we control for the existence of central exams, the size of vocational education, age of 
first selection, and the socioeconomic gradient. Each of these educational system features is 
combined with only individual-level features of model 2 in models 8 to 11. The coefficients of these 
four models are given in Appendix III. The results in Appendix IV (models 12 to 15) shows the 
same equations but with entrance selection as an additional control. The effects for the dummies for 
the Netherlands and Flanders in these models are presented in Table 4. 
 
[About here table 5] 
 
																																																								
17. However, there is some uncertainty about the interpretation of the results obtained for the dummy for Netherlands. Given that 
multilevel modeling, just as normal ordinary least squares regression, requires a minimum number of observations at each level, 
we can question if this condition is met in the case of the Netherlands. At the highest level of our model (the nation state), where 
the Netherlands is, we have only five cases in which 26 educational systems are clustered. At the level of educational system, 
where Flanders is, we have 26 cases in which many schools are clustered. Because of the very low number of groups at the 
highest level, the meaning of the insignificance of any variable at this level can be questioned. Statistically, it may be that such 
insignificance occurs because of the low number of cases at that level and not because the coefficient is not substantive. On the 
other hand, we can be certain about significant effects found at this level because of the low likelihood of obtaining significant 
effects with fewer groups at each given level. Therefore, in the explanation of our results in the following sections, we will also 
take into consideration the size of the effect for the Dutch dummy, even if, strictly speaking, this should not be considered. 
However, the Dutch dummy is neither significant in a three level analysis. 
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With models 16 to 23, we combine educational system features in the equations together with 
individual characteristics and different combinations of curriculum-level features. We present these 
various models and combinations to make our results as transparent as possible. All the coefficients 
of these models are given in Appendix V. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1. Explanations of the high scores of the Dutch and Flemish pupils 
 
The main aim of this study is to determine why the pupils in the Netherlands and Flanders perform 
better in international educational comparisons than those in countries with very similar 
socioeconomic as well as educational system features. Our main argument is that in the Dutch case 
this success is achieved through vocationalization and standardization, and in the Flemish case 
through the insurance of low selection into the higher tracks. 
We find mixed support for our first hypothesis on the success of the Dutch educational 
system, that is, the high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by a successful combination of 
vocationalization and standardization. When it comes to the role of the standardization of the Dutch 
educational system, we observe that the strength of the Netherlands dummy is only a bit lower18 in 
model 8 (including individual and exam variables) than in model 2 (including only individual 
variables). However, the Netherlands dummy and the effect of the central exit exam variable are 
both insignificant in the final model 24. This means that the existence of a central examination is 
not a good empirical explanation of the high scores of the Dutch pupils. 
We do find that the size of the vocational sector can explain the high scores of the Dutch 
pupils. The strength of the Netherlands dummy is only a bit lower19 in model 11 (individual 
variables and percentage vocational education) than in model 2 (only individual variables). But the 
effect of the percentage vocational education is positive and significant in the final model 24 (a 10% 
larger vocational sector give 11.4  points higher on the math test), while the Netherlands dummy is 
insignificant and small (15 points) and thus the percentage vocational education can explain the 
high Dutch math scores. The interim results from Appendices IV (model 15) and V (model 23) 
suggest that this positive effect of percentage vocational education becomes only significant after 
the inclusion of other controls (e.g., entrance selection, the curriculum level). 
																																																								
18. A value of 29 points versus 39 points on the math test. 
19. A value of 30 points versus 39 points on the math test. 
  16
Moreover, Table 3 shows a related aspect of the size of the vocational sector: The average 
socioeconomic composition of Dutch vocational schools is relatively high compared to other 
educational systems; only the vocational schools in the Swiss canton Aargau have an even better 
socioeconomic composition. That might explain why in model 2, after the inclusion of the parental 
ESCS, the Netherlands dummy already becomes insignificant. Because the Dutch vocational sector 
both is among the largest of the compared systems and has the best socioeconomic composition of 
the lowest vocational sector, the Netherlands dummy already becomes small in model 5 (where we 
do not control for percentage vocational education or attending a vocational curriculum but already 
control for the socioeconomic background of the pupils). 
 Our second hypothesis, which assumes that the low entrance selection can explain the high 
scores of the Flemish pupils, is supported by our results. The Flemish dummy in model 4, with the 
inclusion of the variable entrance selection, becomes insignificant and smaller.20 The Flanders 
dummy is also insignificant in models 12 to 15 (Appendix IV), which have entrance selection as a 
control. As said earlier, Flanders has a relatively low score on high entrance selection and a 
relatively high score on low entrance selection. This may reflect their unique cascade model in 
secondary schools, with a low level of entrance selection but a high level of internal downward 
mobility (Boone & Van Houtte, 2013). 
 
6.2. The difference that vocational orientation, standardization, and low entrance selection 
make 
 
A low level of entrance selection still has a negative effect on educational performance (-3.6), while 
a high level of entrance selection has a positive effect (7.8). It may be that, despite all the controls, 
these effects still reflect some unmeasured variance between the pupils who have passed these 
various levels of entrance selection. But a more plausible explanation is that a school’s level of 
entrance selection indicates its ambition and quality, which influence the performance of its pupils. 
We do not find a positive effect on educational performance for a highly stratified system with 
central exit exams. As long as we do not control for the curriculum level, a central exit exam has a 
positive effect on math scores of around 12 points (model 8 or 16). It may be that within highly 
stratified educational systems, curricula and exit exams have the same function: setting standards 
for teachers and pupils. A curriculum may fulfill this function better and make the additional effect 
of a central exit exam insignificant. 
																																																								
20. A value of 25 points (model 4) versus 39 points (model 2). 
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Age of selection in a highly stratified system still has a positive effect on educational 
performance, despite all the controls. Given that the range of this age among these highly stratified 
educational systems runs between 10 and 12 and the German Länder apply in most cases 10 years, 
the two-year difference with Flanders, the Netherlands, and most Swiss German cantons gives 
German and Austrian pupils a 22.2 lower average math score. 
The size of the vocational sector of a highly stratified system has a positive effect on the math 
scores of all pupils. Given the negative effect of attending a lower vocational track (-56.8), the 
arrear of these 57 points is bridged if the size of the vocational sector is equal to 50%.21 However, 
the scores of pupils in the medium and high curricula increase at the same pace with a larger 
vocational sector and thus these scores also increase by 57 points. This can be explained by the 
higher selectivity of the schools offering medium and high curricula if they receive lower 
percentages of less-able pupils due to the larger size of the vocational sector. 
 
6.3. Other results 
 
It should be noted that these results are also relevant for the individual German Länder because they 
are separately included in the multilevel analyses and not as the combinations presented in Tables 2 
and 3. We expect that these results would not be different if we could openly compare these Länder, 
as we have done with Flanders and the Netherlands. 
The parental socioeconomic background has its usual significant effect (7.5), but the strength 
of the average ESCS school composition (which uses the same index and has more or less the same 
range; see Table 1) in the final model 24 is three times higher (26.3). Attending a school with a high 
socioeconomic composition remains important for educational performance, despite the fact that we 
control for the curriculum level, a parameter as substantial as school composition (lower vocational 
track -56.8, high 55.0). Taking into account school curriculum level is thus also important in 
understanding the educational performance of pupils, but the attended curriculum level does not 
fully explain the effect of parental ESCS or the average ESCS school composition. 
In view of the many policy debates about the benefits of ESCS school diversity for educational 
performance (as part of the debate on the need to change toward a more comprehensive educational 
system), it is remarkable that there is no significant effect of ESCS school diversity after controlling 
for curriculum level. It may be possible that ESCS school diversity is erroneously mixed up with 
the curriculum level and that the level effect is wrongly attributed to school diversity. It should be 
																																																								
21. Here 56.84 (attending a lower vocational stream)/1.139 (size of vocational sector). 
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noted, however, that ethnic school diversity has a negative effect on the educational performance of 
migrant pupils, even after all possible controls (Dronkers & van der Velden, 2012). But this 
negative effect is contrary to the assumed positive effect of diversity. 
The percentage of native pupils in schools has a positive effect on the educational performance 
of native pupils (10% more native pupils is related with 1.5 points more at the math test), despite all 
controls for ESCS, school composition, curriculum level, urban living, private schools, and so forth. 
A possible explanation is that a higher percentage of non-native pupils is a larger challenge for the 
teacher and thus decreases the real teaching and learning time for native pupils as well. 
Pupils in private dependent schools still have, despite all controls, higher scores (by 3.2 points), 
while pupils in private independent schools have lower scores (by -18.5 points) than comparable 
pupils in comparable public schools. This is in line with earlier research (Dronkers & Robert, 2008; 
Dronkers & Avram, 2010a, 2010b), which found the same effects for these countries with highly 
stratified educational systems. 
A large school size promotes the educational performance of its pupils (100 more pupils means 
a 2.5-point higher score). This result runs against lay wisdom that small schools are better for 
children but supports the general line of research. However, the negative effect of the school size 
squared variable indicates that this positive effect levels off and becomes negative for secondary 
schools larger than 4016 pupils. 
Finally, the variance in a model with only the Netherlands and Flanders dummies (model 1, 
Table 5) can be divided between four hierarchical levels: the national state, educational systems, 
curricula, and pupils. The variances at these levels are as follows in model 1: 447 (5.5%), 87 
(1.1%), 4132 (51.2%), and 3407 (42.2%). Our multilevel models can explain substantial parts of 
these variances, but the left variances of model 24 show that significant variances remain 
unexplained at each level—126 (3.3%), 130 (3.5%), 689 (18.4%), and 2809 (74.8%). This means 
that the observed educational system, school, and pupil characteristics decrease the unexplained 
variance at the national state level by 72% (1 - 126/447), at the school level by 83% (1 - 689/4132), 
and at the pupil level by 18% (1 - 2809/3407). However, these characteristics increase the 
unexplained variance at the educational system level by 33% (87/130). This means that these 
differences in these characteristics between the analyzed systems decrease the differences in the 
added value of the educational systems of the different countries, regions, cantons, and Länder. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The main aim of this article is to explain the high scores of 15-year-old pupils in the Netherlands 
and Flanders by comparing them with those of pupils in countries with similar highly stratified 
educational systems. Moreover, we examine if individual-, curriculum-, and educational system-
level features play different roles for educational achievement in highly stratified educational 
systems with general and vocational training. To this end, we compare the educational performance 
of 15-year-old pupils from the Netherlands, Flanders, Wallonia, the German Länder, the Swiss 
German cantons, and Austria. 
We used multilevel modeling for the purpose of our empirical analysis because our data are 
hierarchically clustered in groups. Our multilevel analysis has four hierarchical levels: the national 
state, educational systems, curricula, and pupils. Different from previous studies about the effects of 
educational systems, we use curriculum level as the school level. We do so because it allows us to 
include the level of the curriculum taught in the analyses. We thus avoid overestimating the school 
composition effect, especially in stratified educational systems, or misspecifying the effects of the 
features of educational systems. 
 
7.1. Explanation of the high Flemish and Dutch scores 
 
The high scores of the Dutch pupils can be explained by the size of the Netherlands’ vocational 
sector (first hypothesis). We find that the larger the vocational sector of a highly stratified system, 
the better all pupils within that educational system perform. The Netherlands has the largest 
vocational sector of all educational systems compared in this analysis. A large vocational sector 
may increase the labor market focus of an educational system and thus promote efficient learning 
by pupils through a more focused curriculum and teaching. Consequently, after the inclusion of this 
size of the vocational sector in the analysis, the scores of the Dutch pupils were the same as those 
for the other countries with highly stratified systems. The policy drive toward the generalization of 
the content of secondary education since 1968 (in an attempt to lower educational inequality) has 
threatened to make vocational education a dead-end street with a very low socioeconomic 
composition. Relative to policy makers in other highly stratified systems (such as Aargau, the 
German city-Länder, the northwestern and eastern German Länder, and Wallonia), the Dutch policy 
makers were unsuccessful in this policy drive and we contribute the high scores of all Dutch pupils 
to the large Dutch vocational sector. 
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Central exit exams are not an independent explanation of the high scores of Dutch pupils (first 
hypothesis). The curriculum may sett the standards for teachers and pupils better within a highly 
stratified system than a central exam can. 
The high Flemish scores can be partly explained by the high curriculum mobility (as indicated 
by the highest level of medium entrance selection). The Flemish educational system has relatively 
open entrance at each curriculum level in secondary school, but a high level of internal (downward) 
curriculum mobility (“cascade model”) as well. The “not too high but not too low” level of entrance 
selection (trying to combine the best of two solutions) and the high level of curriculum mobility 
within schools and between tracks improve the matching of pupils to their educational attainment 
and achievement. This can improve efficient learning and thus leads to high scores. However, we 
cannot fully explain the high scores of the Flemish pupils. A historical explanation may be that the 
successful 20th-century struggle for survival of the Flemish language may have given the Flemish 
education a higher ethos and desire to outperform their Walloon co-patriots. 
 
7.2. Educational policy can make a difference 
 
Our analysis shows another very important result, with further implications than only for Dutch and 
Flemish policy makers. Despite our limitation to only countries, regions, Länder, or cantons with 
highly stratified systems, we still find significant effects of educational policies and arrangements 
on the educational performance of pupils. This means that policy makers do not need to first 
overhaul their educational system from a highly stratified one into a comprehensive one before they 
can improve the educational performance of their country. It also means that parents and teachers 
can more easily build coalitions between citizen and schools to improve their schools and that they 
do not need to wait until the educational system can be changed. 
 We briefly summarize which policies and arrangements within highly stratified system can 
make a difference. Some entrance selection by schools can be useful to strengthen their ambition 
and quality, which influence the performance of their pupils. The introduction of private dependent 
schools (in contrast with private independent schools) can increase a moderate form of competition 
between schools for pupils and thus improve teaching quality. The small size of secondary schools 
can be negatively related to educational performance, but building large “education factories” can 
also be harmful. Curricula and exit exams are important for the same function: setting standards for 
teachers and pupils regarding what to teach. Curricula seem to fulfill this function better than 
exams. First selection at the age of 12 instead of 10 increases the educational performance of all 
pupils. A vocational sector that is large enough to be vibrant and promote efficient teaching in 
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preparation for the labor market improves the educational performance of all pupils, including those 
who do not attend vocational education. The related higher selectivity of schools offering medium 
and high curricula if they receive lower percentages of pupils due to the larger size of the vocational 
sector may avoid a watering down of the curriculum and a slackening of standards. We do not find 
a trade-off between socioeconomic inequality and high educational performance within highly 
stratified systems, in contrast to Von Below (2002). 
 
7.3. Implications for the explanation of the differences in educational performance of the 
German Länder 
 
Although the intention of this paper is not to compare the educational systems of the German 
Länder, some conclusions about the effectiveness of their educational systems can be drawn from 
the analysis. It is the first sophisticated analysis of the effectiveness of highly stratified systems for 
the educational performance of native pupils.22 Of the 26 educational systems compared, 14 are part 
of the Bundes Republik Deutschland and the educational systems of the other non-German countries 
have many features in common with it. 
Some entrance selection by schools can be useful to strengthen their ambition and quality, 
which influence the performance of their pupils. Compared with low, medium, and high entrance 
selection average values of 21%, 49%, and 30%, respectively, the city-Länder have a remarkable 
low level of high entrance selection (9%) and the same holds for the northwestern Länder (15%). 
Given the positive effect of high entrance selection on math scores, these low levels of entrance 
selection may be detrimental for the educational performance of native pupils in these Länder. 
Private dependent schools (in contrast with private independent schools) can increase a 
moderate form of competition between schools for pupils and thus improve teaching quality. The 
average percentage of private dependent schools is 23%, and the Netherlands and Flanders are 
mainly responsible for this average. All German Länder have lower percentages, especially the 
northwestern and northeastern Länder. 
First selection at the age of 12 instead of 10 increases the educational performance of all 
pupils. All German Länder have 10 years as the age of first selection, which is quite early compared 
with the other countries with highly stratified systems. Increasing the age of selection by one year 
may increase the math scores of German native pupils by 11 points. 
																																																								
22. The only available comparison between the German Länder (Köller, Knigge & Tesch, 2010) applies descriptive tables and 
simple OLS regressions, does not include educational system characteristics to explain cross-Länder differences and does not 
distinguish between native pupils and pupils with a migrant background.  
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A vocational sector that is large enough to be vibrant and promote efficient teaching in 
preparation for the labor market improves the educational performance of all pupils, including those 
who do not attend vocational education. The related higher selectivity of schools offering medium 
and high curricula if they receive lower percentages of pupils due to the larger vocational sector 
may avoid watering down the curriculum and slackening standards. Although vocational education 
is often seen as a German institution, the size of the vocational sector in northeastern Länder (5%) is 
below the average (13%). 
Higher percentages of native pupils in schools increase the math scores of native pupils (10% 
more native pupils, 1.5 points higher). The city-Länder have a lower percentage of native pupils 
(74%) than other Länder, such as the northeastern Länder (96%) and southeastern Länder (91%), 
with an average percentage of 87% native pupils for all highly stratified systems compared. This 
variation in the percentage of native pupils means that the lower math score of the city-Länder (508) 
is an underestimation of the real quality of their educational organization, while the high math score 
of the southeastern Länder (535) overestimates the real quality of these Länder’ educational 
organization. 
One of the reasons for the ongoing stalemate in the German debates of educational policies is 
the assumed trade-off between socioeconomic inequality and high educational performance within 
highly stratified systems (Von Below (2002)). We do not find such a trade-off for the educational 
systems compared. The same holds for the German Länder, whose average socioeconomic gradient 
is 9.4; the gradient for the five combinations of German Länder is 8.1 for the northeastern Länder, 
8.9 for the southeastern Länder, 11.1 for the city- and southwestern Länder, and 12.1 for the 
northwestern Länder. 
Unfortunately, discussing the policy implications for the German Länder in more detail is 
forbidden. But already the results show that a more transparent analysis of the differences in the 
educational performance of the Länder will enlighten the German public and can break the ongoing 
stalemate in German educational policy making through independent research. The remaining 
unexplained variance in the educational system levels shows that the added value of the education 
of the German Länder will be quite different and thus interesting for parents, teachers, and policy 
makers interested in a transparent state. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics of all educational systems pooled together 
Variable No. of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math score 48,786 529.73 86.93 150.09 1072.80 
Parental ESCS 48,786 0.35 0.81 -3.68 3.20 
Female 48,786 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Grade 48,385 0.04 0.60 -2.74 2.87 
Curriculum features      
Average school ESCS  48,786 0.30 0.44 -2.25 1.69 
ESCS school diversity 48,786 0.64 0.08 0 0.78 
% native pupils curriculum 48,786 86.88 14.30 4.55 100 
Lower vocational curriculum 48,786 0.22 0.41 0 1 
High curriculum 48,786 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Low selection 48,786 0.21 0.41 0 1 
High selection 48,786 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Private gov. independent 48,786 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Private gov. dependent 48,786 0.23 0.42 0 1 
School size 48,786 655.99 397.07 15 3931 
Rural area 48,786 0.39 0.49 0 1 
City 48,786 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Educational system features      
% lower vocational education 48,786 22.03 13.18 0 53.31 
Age of selection 48,786 10.79 0.96 10 12 
Exit exam 48,786 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Socioeconomic gradient 48,786 9.44 4.58 0.57 25.05 
Source: PISA 2006. The data for the Swiss cantons are from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (EDK), the data for 
the German Länder are from the Institut zur Qualitätsentwicklung im Bildungswesen (IQB), and the data for all the 
other countries are from the PISA website. 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics of all variables for each of the educational systems 
 
  
Math 
Score 
Parental 
 ECSC 
Female Grade % Native 
 Pupils  
Average 
School 
 ESCS  
ESCS 
 School 
 Diversity 
Lower 
Vocational 
Curriculum  
High Curriculum 
Aargau 557.80 0.25 0.48 0.03 82.62 0.15 0.65 0.15 0.45 
  (79.84) (0.78) (0.50) (0.66) (14.72) (0.42) (0.09) (0.36) (0.50) 
Bern (German) 544.23 0.13 0.51 -0.13 90.28 0.09 0.62 0.34 0.24 
  (75.58) (0.82) (0.50) (0.57) (12.77) (0.46) (0.08) -(0.48) -(0.43) 
Basel-Landschaft 541.88 0.27 0.50 -0.02 84.58 0.21 0.63 0.27 0.34 
  (81.64) (0.77) (0.50) (0.61) (13.10) (0.40) (0.09) (0.44) (0.47) 
St. Gallen 564.38 0.09 0.49 0.00 81.13 0.02 0.66 0.30 0.15 
  (75.93) (0.83) (0.50) (0.66) (13.54) (0.39) (0.08) (0.46) (0.36) 
Schaffhausen 577.70 0.29 0.49 0.01 82.54 0.22 0.64 0.31 0.22 
  (84.78) (0.75) (0.50) (0.68) (13.49) (0.36) (0.09) (0.46) (0.41) 
Thurgau 560.47 0.09 0.49 -0.05 86.11 0.04 0.65 0.37 0.08 
  (75.15) (0.77) (0.50) (0.63) (12.79) (0.35) (0.07) (0.48) (0.28) 
Zurich 560.72 0.30 0.51 -0.10 78.47 0.19 0.62 0.30 0.26 
  (80.00) (0.77) (0.50) (0.61) (17.36) (0.43) (0.10) (0.46) (0.44) 
Wallis 551.64 0.06 0.49 0.01 89.23 0.02 0.63 0.30 0.43 
  (74.77) (0.74) (0.50) (0.43) (8.51) (0.31) (0.10) (0.46) (0.50) 
Southeastern German Länder 535.01 0.38 0.50 0.03 91.52 0.36 0.62 0.18 0.36 
 (80.30) (0.78) (0.50) (0.61) (8.71) (0.41) (0.08) (0.34) (0.48) 
German city-Länder 507.62 0.40 0.47 0.07 73.80 0.31 0.64 0.15 0.34 
 (91.08) (0.83) (0.50) (0.65) (17.31) (0.51) (0.08) (0.35) (0.47) 
Southwestern German Länder 524.42 0.50 0.51 0.06 81.60 0.44 0.62 0.23 0.36 
 (84.40) (0.78) (0.50) (0.60) (13.74) (0.43) (0.09) (0.42) (0.48) 
Northwestern German Länder 515.71 0.48 0.50 0.05 80.98 0.41 0.64 0.18 0.33 
 (84.36) (0.80) (0.50) (0.64) (12.89) (0.43) (0.07) (0.38) (0.47) 
Northeastern German Länder 509.69 0.32 0.48 0.01 96.49 0.32 0.63 0.05 0.34 
 (85.00) (0.79) (0.50) (0.66) (4.69) (0.39) (0.08) (0.17) (0.47) 
Austria 519.94 0.27 0.50 0.04 90.40 0.22 0.64 0.24 0.24 
  (86.63) (0.78) (0.50) (0.55) (10.57) (0.39) (0.07) (0.43) (0.43) 
Flanders 553.32 0.27 0.46 0.03 94.69 0.25 0.66 0.22 0.48 
  (89.47) (0.85) (0.50) (0.47) (8.95) (0.46) (0.08) (0.41) (0.50) 
Wallonia 518.95 0.27 0.49 0.09 85.84 0.24 0.66 0.15 0.59 
  (92.02) (0.86) (0.50) (0.59) (15.02) (0.47) (0.07) (0.36) (0.49) 
The Netherlands 544.90 0.38 0.49 0.03 91.34 0.32 0.67 0.53 0.24 
  (81.54) (0.82) (0.50) (0.56) (10.90) (0.40) (0.06) (0.50) (0.43) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 Low Selection 
High 
Selection 
Private 
 Government 
Independent 
Private 
Government 
Dependent 
School 
 Size 
School 
 in Rural 
 Area 
School 
 in the 
 City 
% Lower 
Vocational 
Education 
Age 
 of 
Selection 
Central 
 Exit Exam 
Socio 
 Economic 
 gradient 
Aargau 0.03 0.83 0.00 0.00 354.1 0.96 0.00 15.2 11.00 0 4.51 
  (0.16) (0.38) (0.00) (0.00) (179.5) (0.21) (0.00)     
Bern (German) 0.25 0.47 0.04 0.00 320.1 0.67 0.01 34.3 12.00 0 9.81 
  (0.44) (0.50) (0.19) (0.00) (216.5) -(0.47) -(0.30)     
Basel-Landschaft 0.09 0.61 0.00 0.00 586.5 0.79 0.00 26.5 11.00 0 9.91 
  (0.29) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (294.9) (0.41) (0.00)     
St. Gallen 0.23 0.51 0.00 0.00 353.7 0.72 0.00 30.3 12.00 0 6.94 
  (0.42) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (237.5) (0.45) (0.00)     
Schaffhausen 0.08 0.53 0.00 0.00 321.8 0.41 0.00 31.1 12.00 0 7.19 
  (0.27) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (240.3) (0.49) (0.00)     
Thurgau 0.24 0.38 0.00 0.01 254.4 0.89 0.00 36.6 12.00 0 9.34 
  (0.43) (0.49) (0.00) (0.09) (172.4) (0.31) (0.00)     
Zurich 0.19 0.43 0.00 0.05 409.0 0.51 0.21 29.7 12.00 0 3.57 
  (0.39) (0.50) (0.00) (0.22) (268.9) (0.50) (0.41)     
Wallis 0.35 0.40 0.00 0.00 795.3 0.69 0.00 30.3 12.00 0 6.81 
  (0.48) (0.49) (0.00) (0.00) (478.7) (0.46) (0.00)     
Southeastern German Länder 0.24 0.36 0.00 0.08 532.9 0.45 0.13 18.0 10.00 1 8.90 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.03) (0.26) (281.6) (0.50) (0.34)     
German city-Länder 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.17 627.7 0.01 0.88 15.0 10.67 0 11.11 
 (0.43) (0.29) (0.02) (0.37) (284.1) (0.05) (0.32)     
Southwestern German Länder 0.19 0.29 0.01 0.13 718.1 0.45 0.12 23.0 10.00 0.7 11.11 
 (0.38) (0.43) (0.07) (0.33) (304.0) (0.49) (0.32)     
Northwestern German Länder 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.10 786.3 0.38 0.18 18.0 10.00 0 12.08 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.08) (0.30) (390.4) (0.47) (0.37)     
Northeastern German Länder 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.08 497.7 0.45 0.12 5.0 10.00 0.7 8.14 
 (0.42) (0.41) 0.00 (0.27) (254.3) (0.50) (0.31)     
Austria 0.22 0.50 0.00 0.08 547.9 0.48 0.28 23.8 10.00 0 11.24 
  (0.41) (0.50) (0.00) (0.27) (415.1) (0.50) (0.45)     
Flanders 0.31 0.15 0.07 0.69 661.6 0.30 0.11  21.5 12.00 0 9.80 
  (0.46) (0.35) (0.25) (0.46) (298.2) (0.46) (0.31)     
Wallonia 0.37 0.06 0.02 0.59 796.5 0.29 0.21 15.1 12.00 0 3.88 
  (0.48) (0.24) (0.15) (0.49) (284.6) (0.46) (0.41)     
The Netherlands 0.01 0.55 0.00 0.69 1062.8 0.19 0.21 53.3 12.00 1.0 8.60 
  (0.11) (0.50) (0.00) (0.46) (538.1) (0.39) (0.41)     
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. The values for the 
five groups of German Länder are based on observed Länder averages, which we are not allowed to publish by contract with IQB. The southeastern German Länder are Sachsen, Thüringen, and 
Bavaria; the German city-Länder are Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin; the southwestern German Länder are Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Saarland; the northwestern German Länder 
are Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen, and Schleswig-Holstein; and the northeastern German Länder are Sachsen-Anholt, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. 
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Table 3 
Average parental ESCS level by curriculum in each educational system 
 Low Medium High 
Aargau 0.27 0.37 0.52 
Bern (German) 0.08 0.26 0.37 
Basel-Landschaft -0.12 0.08 0.27 
St. Gallen 0.02 0.19 0.26 
Schaffhausen -0.07 0.31 0.73 
Thurgau -0.20 0.02 0.08 
Zurich -0.07 0.32 0.68 
Wallis -0.24 0.08 0.19 
Southeastern German Länder -0.18 0.23 0.80 
German city-Länder -0.23 0.21 0.94 
Southwestern German Länder 0.01 0.37 0.92 
Northwestern German Länder -0.11 0.36 0.96 
Northeastern German Länder -0.22 0.11 0.77 
Austria -0.02 0.15 0.84 
Flanders -0.33 0.13 0.64 
Wallonia -0.36 0.04 0.53 
The Netherlands 0.10 0.55 0.83 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the data for  all the other 
countries are from the PISA website. The averages for the five groups of German Länder are based on observed Länder values, which we 
are not allowed to publish by contract with IQB. The southeastern German Länder are Sachsen, Thüringen, and Bavaria; the German city-
Länder are Bremen, Hamburg, and Berlin; the southwestern German Länder are Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Saarland; the 
northwestern German Länder are Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Niedersachsen, and Schleswig-Holstein; and the northeastern German 
Länder are Sachsen-Anholt; Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.
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Table 4 
Coefficients for Flanders and the Netherlands in a series of multilevel analyses  
 Flanders Netherlands 
M1: no controls 40.9** (14.0) 50.1** (25.1) 
M2: controls for all individual characteristics 38.8** (14.2) 38.9 (24.6) 
M3: M2 & % natives, average school ESCS, ESCS school diversity 34.6* (13.8) 18.5 (31.0) 
M4: M2 & entrance selection school 25.3 (15.5) 22.2 (15.5) 
M5: M2 & school size, school size squared 45.7 (24.3) 10.1 (39.9) 
M6: M2 & curriculum level 45.8* (20.8) 39.2 (34.9) 
M7: M2 & controls for all curriculum characteristics  41.7* (19.0) 22.1 (35.2) 
M8: M2 & central exit exams 40.1** (12.8) 29.3 (25.4) 
M9: M2 & age of selection 39.1** (14.5) 39.9 (25.7) 
M10: M2 & socioeconomic gradient 41.0** (14.4) 39.1 (24.7) 
M11: M2 & % lower vocational education 36.6* (14.3) 30.0 (24.5) 
M24: all individual, curriculum & system controls 56.2** (18.4) 14.5 (25.9) 
Source: See appendices II to V for full equations. 
 
  30
Table 5: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual, curriculum, and educational 
system levels), with Ni = 48385; Ns = 2816; Nes = 26; Nns = 5. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 7 Model 24 
Flanders 40.9** (14.0) 38.8** (14.2) 41.7* (19.0) 56.2** (18.4) 
The Netherlands 50.1* (25.1) 38.9 (24.6) 22.1 (35.2) 14.51 (25.9) 
Individual     
Parental ESCS   11.1*** (0.4) 7.2*** (0.4) 7.5*** (0.4) 
Female   -26.0*** (0.5) -27.5*** (0.6) -27.5*** (0.5) 
Grade   27.8*** (0.5) 24.7*** (0.5) 25.6*** (0.4) 
Curriculum     
Average school ESCS     26.0*** (2.0) 26.3*** (1.9) 
ESCS school diversity    10.9 (7.3) 7.5 (7.0) 
% Natives     0.15** (0.05) 0.15** (0.04) 
Lower vocational curriculum (ref. 
medium)   -57.6
*** (1.4) -56.8*** (1.4) 
High curriculum (ref. medium)    54.4*** (1.5) 55.0*** (1.4) 
Low selection (ref. medium selection)     -4.4** (1.5) -3.6** (1.4) 
High selection (ref. medium selection)     7.3*** (1.4) 7.8*** (1.3) 
Private gov. independent (ref. public)    -16.4** (5.3) -18.5*** (5.2) 
Private gov. dependent (ref. public)    8.3*** (1.7) 3.2* (1.5) 
School size    0.03*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.00) 
School size squared    -0.00001
** 
(0.00) 
-0.00001** 
(0.00) 
Rural area (ref. town)     -8.9*** (1.7) 1.8 (1.3) 
City (ref. town)   0.1 (0.1) -6.8*** (1.6) 
Educational system     
Central exit exam    9.5 (6.4) 
Age of selection    11.1* (4.5) 
Socioeconomic gradient    -0.4 (0.6) 
% lower vocational education    1.13*** (0.29) 
      
Constant 509.2*** (11.2) 522.5*** (10.9) 489.5*** (18.0) 277.6*** (58.6) 
Variance components     
National state level 446.6*** (405.1) 425.0
*** 
(376.8) 
1029.7*** 
(861.9) 126.0
** (205.9) 
Educational system level 87.1*** (40.7) 95.9*** (41.0) 200.3*** (65.0) 130.4*** (48.7) 
Curriculum level 4131.8
*** 
(118.7) 
3214.3*** 
(94.9) 688.3
*** (26.1) 688.9*** (24.4) 
Individual level 3407.3*** (22.5) 2982.2
*** 
(19.8) 2817.3
*** (19.9) 2809.0*** (18.6) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the data 
for all the other countries are from the PISA website.
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Appendix I: Definition of curriculum levels 
 
We classify the curricula into three different categories: 1) low for low vocational education; 2) medium for higher 
vocational education and lower general education, with no access to tertiary education; and 3) high for higher general 
education that gives direct access to tertiary education upon finishing high school. We use the original version of the 
so-called unique national study programme code from the PISA 2006 codebook. Table A1 illustrates the 
categorization of the curricula in each of the countries considered. 
 
Table A1: curriculum level per country. 
Country/ 
curriculum Low  Medium  High  
Austria 
Vocational  program 
Middle vocational school 
Vocational college 
Lower secondary school 
Upper secondary school 
Apprenticeship 
Higher vocational school 
Gymnasium lower 
secondary 
Gymnasium upper 
secondary 
Belgium 
Second year of first stage— 
preparing for vocational 
secondary education 
2nd & 3rd vocational 
secondary education 
Part-time vocational secondary 
education focused on the labor 
markets 
2nd year of vocational 
education (French/German) 
Complementary year to first 
degree (French community 
only) 
2nd & 3rd degrees of 
vocational education 
(FR/GER) 
Vocational training focused on 
the labor market (FR com 
only) 
Special sec. educ. (lower sec. - 
training form 3) (Wallonia 
only) 
Special sec. educ. (lower sec.) 
(GER only) 
Second- & third-stage technical 
secondary education 
Special sec. educ. - upper sec. 
(training form 3 / years 4 and 5) 
2nd & 3rd degrees of techn. or 
art. educ. (transition) (FR/GER) 
2nd & 3rd degrees of techn. or 
art. Educ. (qualif.) (FR/GER) 
Special sec. Educ. (upper sec.-
training form 3) (FR only) 
(First year a of first stage 
of) general education 
Second year of first stage 
preparing for regular sec. 
educ. 
Second & third stage 
regular secondary 
education 
First degree of general 
education (FR/GER) 
Second & third degrees of 
general education 
(FR/GER) 
Germany 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
secondary (Hauptschule) 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
sec. (koop. Gesamtschule 
Hauptschule) 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
secondary (Hauptschule 
integrated) 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
secondary (Hauptschulklasse) 
Pre-vocational training year 
Vocational school 
(Berufsfachschule) 
Lower secondary with access to 
upper secondary 
(comprehensive) 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
secondary (Realschule) 
Comprehensive lower sec. with 
access to upper sec. 
(Gesamtschule) 
Lower sec., with or without 
access to upper sec. (koop. 
Gesamtschules, Realschule) 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
secondary (Realschule 
integrated) 
Lower sec., no access to upper 
secondary (Realschulklasse) 
Vocational school (Berufsschule) 
 
Lower sec. With access to 
upper secondary 
(Gymnasium) 
Upper sec. Level 
(Gymnasium) 
Lower sec., with access to 
upper sec. (Koop. Gs, 
Gymn.) 
Lower secondary with 
access to upper secondary 
(Waldorf) 
Upper secondary level of 
education (Waldorf) 
The 
Netherlands 
Practical preparation for labor 
market 
Vmbo (general voc.) 
Vmbo bb (1-2 year) 
Vmbo bb (3-4 year) 
Vmbo kb (1-2 year) 
Havo (year 1-3) 
Havo (sec. year 4-5) 
Vwo (year 1-3) 
Vwo (year 4-6) 
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Vmbo kb (3-4 year) 
Vmbo gl/ tl (1-2 year) 
Vmbo gl/ tl (3-4 year) 
 
Switzerland 
23(German 
cantons) 
 
Basic requirements 
Heterogeneous basic 
requirements 
 
Intermediate requirements 
Heterogeneous intermediate 
requirements 
 
 
Higher requirements 
Heterogeneous higher 
requirements 
Source: PISA 2006 codebook. 
 
 
   
																																																								
23. Pupils are allocated to institutionally separate school types, according to their performance levels. The structure is based on the 
principle of equal capacities among pupils. Generally, each school type has its own adapted curricula, teaching material, and 
teachers and, in some cases, its own range of subjects. In general, there are two to three school types (four in a minority of 
cantons), whose names vary. In the structure with two school types, a distinction is made between the performance-based 
group at the basic level (with the least demanding requirements) and the performance-based group at the advanced level. In the 
structure with three school types, there is a performance-based group at the basic, intermediate, and advanced levels. The 
requirements of the performance-based group at the advanced level are the most demanding and this school type generally 
prepares pupils for transfer to the Matura schools. 
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Appendix II: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual and curriculum controls), with 
Ni = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Flanders 40.92** 38.78** 34.61* 25.27 45.67 45.80* 41.73* 
  (14.030) (14.210) (13.760) (15.470) (24.310) (20.800) (19.040) 
Netherlands 50.06* 38.93 18.49 22.24 10.06 39.15 22.07 
  (25.060) (24.550) (31.010) (15.520) (39.890) (34.940) (35.200) 
Individual 
level        
Parental 
ESCS   11.09
*** 9.233*** 10.80*** 10.38*** 8.260*** 7.247*** 
    (0.362) (0.365) (0.362) (0.360) (0.353) (0.379) 
Female   -26.01*** -26.21*** -26.28*** -25.93*** -27.58*** -27.52*** 
   (0.534) (0.531) (0.532) (0.529) (0.515) (0.551) 
Grade   27.82*** 27.50*** 27.68*** 27.23*** 25.81*** 24.68*** 
    (0.458) (0.455) (0.456) (0.454) (0.441) (0.474) 
Curriculum         
% natives      0.114*       0.153** 
      (0.051)       (0.047) 
Average 
school ESCS      95.57
***       25.96*** 
      (1.855)       (1.966) 
ESCS school 
diversity     45.43
***       10.91 
      (8.819)       (7.296) 
Low selection       -20.82***     -4.404** 
 (ref. medium 
selection)       (2.147)     (1.464) 
High selection       31.49***     7.332*** 
 (ref. medium 
selection)       (1.939)     (1.388) 
School size         0.170***   0.0256*** 
          (0.006)   (0.005) 
School size 
squared         -0.0000575
***   -0.00000704** 
          (0.000)   (0.000) 
Lower 
vocational 
curriculum 
          -67.90*** -57.55*** 
 (ref. medium)           (1.322) (1.444) 
High 
curriculum           68.89
*** 54.35*** 
 (ref. medium)           (1.265) (1.473) 
Private gov. 
indep.             -16.36
** 
 (ref. public)             (5.349) 
Private gov. 
dep.              8.303
*** 
 (ref. public)             (1.701) 
City             -8.878*** 
 (ref. town)             (1.703) 
Rural        0.124 
(ref. town)       (0.09) 
Constant 509.2*** 522.5*** 472.1*** 521.4*** 452.8*** 527.0*** 489.5*** 
  (11.170) (10.930) (16.230) (3.309) (19.090) (16.270) (18.030) 
Variance 
components        
National state 
level 446.6
*** 425.0*** 797.9*** x 1325.6*** 967.3*** 1029.7*** 
  (405.100) (376.800) (649.200)  (1140.100) (835.500) (861.900) 
Educational 87.07*** 95.94*** 93.96*** 223.9*** 338.6*** 247.1*** 200.3*** 
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system level 
  (40.740) (40.980) (34.290) (77.220) (114.300) (78.960) (64.990) 
Curriculum 
level 4131.8
*** 3214.3*** 1264.1*** 2995.9*** 2630.9*** 820.1*** 688.3*** 
  (118.700) (94.890) (40.980) (89.080) (79.010) (27.910) (26.140) 
Individual 
level 3407.3
*** 2982.2*** 2983.0*** 2964.4*** 2935.5*** 2815.7*** 2817.3*** 
  (22.480) (19.770) (19.770) (19.650) (19.460) (18.640) (19.900) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and all the 
data for the other countries are from the PISA website. Here the x = four-level model did not converge, so the three-
level model is used.  
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Appendix III: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual and educational system 
controls), with Ni = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Netherlands 29.27 39.86 39.09 29.98 
  (25.440) (25.680) (24.740) (24.470) 
Flanders 40.14** 39.11** 41.03** 36.61* 
  (12.810) (14.540) (14.410) (14.290) 
Individual level     
Parental ESCS 11.10*** 11.09*** 11.09*** 11.09*** 
  (0.362) (0.362) (0.362) (0.362) 
Female -26.01*** -26.01*** -26.01*** -26.01*** 
  (0.534) (0.534) (0.534) (0.534) 
Grade 27.82*** 27.82*** 27.82*** 27.82*** 
  (0.458) (0.458) (0.458) (0.458) 
Educational system     
Central exit exam 12.34*       
  (5.234)       
Age of selection   -0.89     
    (4.796)     
Socioeconomic gradient     -0.446   
      (0.491)   
% lower vocational education       0.291 
        (0.278) 
Constant 520.6*** 532.2*** 526.1*** 516.4*** 
  (11.340) (53.850) (11.760) (11.770) 
Variance components     
National state level 471.9*** 455.8*** 434.3*** 355.4*** 
  (404.400) (406.200) (387.500) (330.200) 
Educational system level 72.11*** 100.7*** 95.80*** 98.13*** 
  (34.230) (43.340) (42.300) (42.640) 
Curriculum level 3213.3*** 3214.4*** 3214.4*** 3214.3*** 
  (94.860) (94.900) (94.900) (94.900) 
Individual level 2982.3*** 2982.2*** 2982.2*** 2982.2*** 
  (19.770) (19.770) (19.770) (19.770) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the 
data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. 
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Appendix IV: Multilevel analysis of the determinants of math scores (individual, entrance selection, and 
educational system controls), with Ni  = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Netherlands 24.06 8.533 21.63 -6.702 
  -(16.670) -(13.590) -(15.210) -(15.480) 
Flanders 24.61 11.56 25.72 23.74 
 -(15.940) -(13.540) -(15.160) -(12.840) 
Individual level     
Parental ESCS 10.80*** 10.81*** 10.80*** 10.80*** 
  -(0.362) -(0.362) -(0.362) -(0.362) 
Female -26.28*** -26.28*** -26.28*** -26.28*** 
  -(0.532) -(0.532) -(0.532) -(0.532) 
Grade 27.68*** 27.68*** 27.68*** 27.68*** 
  -(0.456) -(0.456) -(0.456) -(0.456) 
Educational system     
Central exit exam -2.557       
  -(7.296)       
Age of selection   10.33***     
    -(3.021)     
Socioeconomic gradient     -0.911   
      -(0.630)   
% lower vocational education       0.884*** 
        -(0.263) 
School     
Low selection -20.81*** -20.91*** -20.90*** -20.85*** 
(ref. medium selection)  -(2.147) -(2.145) -(2.147) -(2.145) 
High selection 31.47*** 31.44*** 31.42*** 31.42*** 
 (ref. medium selection)  -(1.939) -(1.936) -(1.940) -(1.937) 
Constant 522.2*** 411.3*** 529.9*** 503.7*** 
  -(3.922) -(32.270) -(6.710) -(5.923) 
Variance components     
National state level x x x x 
      
Educational system level 235.2*** 150.4*** 213.9*** 147.5*** 
  -(81.890) -(53.750) -(75.670) -(54.680) 
Curriculum/school level 2995.7*** 2993.2*** 2995.6*** 2994.9*** 
  -(89.070) -(88.950) -(89.060) -(89.020) 
Individual level 2964.4*** 2964.4*** 2964.4*** 2964.4*** 
  -(19.650) -(19.650) -(19.650) -(19.650) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the 
data for all the other countries are from the PISA website. The x = four-level model did not converge, so the three-
level model is used. 
 
Appendix V: Multilevel analysis of determinants of math scores (individual, curriculum, school, and educational 
system controls), with Ni  = 48385, Ns = 2816, Nes = 26, Nns = 5 
 Model 16 
Model 
17 
Model 
18 
Model 
19 
Model 
20 
Model 
21 
Model 
22 
Model 
23 Model 24 
Netherlands 10.22 14.46 18.54 9.897 29.31 35.97 39.17 8.815 14.51 
  (32.050) (30.170) (30.990) (30.500) (35.960) (35.490) (35.180) (29.870) (25.900) 
Flanders 35.18** 33.91* 35.79* 32.83* 47.21* 44.82* 48.26* 40.31* 56.17** 
  (12.300) (13.970) (14.220) (13.780) (19.920) (21.170) (21.200) (17.010) (18.390) 
Individual          
Parental 
ESCS 9.232
*** 9.233*** 9.233*** 9.233*** 8.262*** 8.260*** 8.260*** 8.256*** 7.454*** 
  (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) (0.353) (0.353) (0.353) (0.353) (0.355) 
Female -26.21*** 
-
26.20*** 
-
26.20*** 
-
26.21*** 
-
27.58*** 
-
27.58*** 
-
27.58*** 
-
27.58*** -27.53
*** 
  (0.531) (0.531) (0.531) (0.531) (0.515) (0.515) (0.515) (0.515) (0.514) 
Grade 27.51*** 27.50*** 27.50*** 27.50*** 25.81*** 25.81*** 25.81*** 25.81*** 25.58*** 
  (0.455) (0.455) (0.455) (0.455) (0.441) (0.441) (0.441) (0.441) (0.440) 
Curriculum          
Average 
school ESCS  95.72
*** 95.59*** 95.58*** 95.49***         26.28*** 
  (1.854) (1.855) (1.855) (1.856)         (1.862) 
ESCS school 
diversity 45.55
*** 45.41*** 45.44*** 45.57***         7.529 
  (8.816) (8.820) (8.820) (8.820)         (6.964) 
% natives  0.101 0.115* 0.114* 0.119*         0.146** 
  (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)         (0.044) 
Lower 
vocational 
curriculum 
        -67.90*** 
-
67.91*** 
-
67.92*** 
-
68.04*** -56.84
*** 
 (ref. 
medium)         (1.322) (1.322) (1.322) (1.323) (1.375) 
High 
curriculum         68.87
*** 68.89*** 68.88*** 68.84*** 54.96*** 
 (ref. 
medium)         (1.265) (1.265) (1.265) (1.265) (1.409) 
Low 
selection                 -3.647
** 
(ref. medium 
selection)                  (1.383) 
High 
selection                 7.791
*** 
(ref. medium 
selection)                  (1.329) 
Private gov. 
independent                 -18.49
*** 
(ref. public)                 (5.163) 
Private gov. 
dependent                 3.155
* 
(ref. public)                 (1.519) 
School size                 0.0249*** 
                 (0.004) 
School size 
squared                 
-
0.00000620
** 
                  (0.000) 
Rural area                 1.814 
(ref. town)                 (1.313) 
  2
City                 -6.837*** 
(ref. town)                 (1.563) 
Educational 
system          
Central exit 
exam 11.41
*       13.65       9.455 
  (4.753)       (7.646)       (6.408) 
Age of 
selection   4.011       3.654     11.11
* 
    (4.485)       (6.653)     (4.526) 
Socioeconom
ic gradient     -0.231       -0.528   -0.42 
      (0.456)       (0.688)   (0.583) 
% lower 
vocational 
education 
      0.288       1.162*** 1.139*** 
        (0.252)       (0.309) (0.288) 
Constant 471.4*** 428.1*** 474.1*** 465.4*** 524.8*** 486.9*** 531.5*** 501.3*** 277.6*** 
  (16.690) (51.780) (16.650) (16.670) (16.750) (74.970) (17.370) (14.550) (58.600) 
Variance 
components          
National 
state level 873.9
*** 723.0*** 793.0*** 711.7*** 1040.0
**
* 967.0
*** 983.4*** 596.1*** 126.0** 
  (705.800) 
(604.60
0) 
(646.70
0) 
(589.10
0) 
(875.40
0) 
(854.30
0) 
(855.10
0) 
(533.40
0) (205.900) 
Educational 
system level 72.00
*** 97.53*** 98.06*** 93.57*** 222.1*** 256.5*** 251.2*** 158.9*** 130.4*** 
  (28.640) (35.880) (36.390) (35.000) (73.250) (83.330) (82.250) (54.230) (48.650) 
Curriculum 
level 
1263.9**
* 
1264.1**
* 
1264.1**
* 
1264.1**
* 820.3
*** 820.1*** 820.1*** 820.1*** 688.9*** 
  (40.970) (40.980) (40.980) (40.980) (27.910) (27.900) (27.910) (27.910) (24.350) 
Individual 
level 
2983.0**
* 
2982.9**
* 
2983.0**
* 
2983.0**
* 
2815.6**
* 
2815.7**
* 
2815.7**
* 
2815.7**
* 2809.0
*** 
  (19.770) (19.770) (19.770) (19.770) (18.640) (18.640) (18.640) (18.640) (18.600) 
Source: PISA 2006. The Swiss canton data are from the EDK, the German Länder data are from the IQB, and the data 
for all the other countries are from the PISA website. 
 
 
